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IV

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court granted certiorari in this case in its order dated October 19, 2004.
QUESTION PRESENTED
"Whether the net amount to be paid for the underinsured damages of the petitioner, insofar
as those damages potentially exceeded the policy limits, was a matter submitted to the arbitrator by
the parties' arbitration agreement."
BRIEF ANSWER
The net amount to be paid for the underinsured damages, including those damages that
potentially exceeded the policy limits, was a matter submitted to the arbitrator by the parties'
arbitration agreement because the agreement submitted the issue of damages without stipulating
either that policy limits would limit an arbitration award, or that the policy limits would not be
disclosed to the arbitrator.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The applicable provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act (2002) relating to the modification of
an arbitration award are as follows:
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving
party, the court modify or correct the award if it appears:
•kick

(b) the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the award can
be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the issues submitted....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l) (2002).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in favor of Allstate Insurance

Company, Wong's underinsured motorist insurer, affirming the trial court's modification of an
arbitrator's award to $100,000 after the arbitrator awarded Wong a net award of $260,926.84.
2.

Procedural History
Wong and Allstate arbitrated this case before an arbitrator. The arbitrator awarded Wong a

net amount of $260,926.84. Allstate contested the arbitrator's award as exceeding the policy limits
of the insurance contract and moved in Utah District Court, Third District, to either vacate or modify
the award. The district court modified the arbitrator's award to $100,000. Wong appealed the
district court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that the
district court erred in modifying the award, but affirmed the outcome. Wong petitioned for
certiorari, and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari.
3.

Statement of the Facts
a.

The Accident and Wong's Injuries

On June 1,2001, Dixon Wong ("Wong") sustained serious injury in an automobile accident.
(R.48). The driver of the other car was entirely at fault. (R.50). Wong suffered a shattered heel
bone, lacerations to the leg and face, chip fracture to his elbow, and multiple other lacerations,
bruises, and abrasions. (R.50). As a result of injuries sustained, Wong incurred $32,576.84 in
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medical expenses. (R.51). Wong's shattered heel bone will require future surgeries costing
approximately $22,000. (R. 51). His injuries cost Wong lost income totaling approximately $ 14,800.
(R.51). His injuries also rendered him partially crippled with chronic pain, impairment of
movement, and scarring. (R.52).
b.

The Disputed Claim

Wong filed an under-insured motorist claim under his insurance policy with Allstate
Insurance Company ("Allstate"). (R.6). Allstate denied his claim. Wong and Allstate disputed the
amount payable to Wong under his under-insured motorist coverage. (R.6). Forfivemonths, until
the day before the arbitration hearing, Allstate maintained an offer of $30,000 to settle the claim.
(R. 44). After some negotiation, the parties mutually agreed to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration. (R.48).
c.

The Arbitration Agreement

Allstate and Wong, through their attorneys, signed an "Arbitration Agreement" and a
"Binding Arbitration Agreement." (R. 47,49). The Arbitration Agreement, as drafted by Allstate,
included a "high/low" agreement, stipulating a $100,000 limit on any arbitration award. (R.47).
Wong's attorney lined out the high/low stipulation, signed, and returned the agreement to Allstate.
(R. 47, 48). After Wong's modification, the clause containing the high/low agreement read:
The parties agree to be bound by a high/low agreement with a high of $100,000 and a low
of $0.00. The terms of this high/low agreement shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator.
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Allstate's attorney signed the altered agreement. (R.48). On March 18, 2002, Allstate and Wong,
through their attorneys, signed the Binding Arbitration Agreement, defining the dispute as
"Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." (R.49).
In letters written after the arbitration agreement was signed, Allstate's and Wong's attorneys
disputed the effect of Wong's insurance policy limits on a potential arbitration award. (R.57, 58).
Wong's attorney argued that the arbitrator was not bound by any policy limit. (R.57). Allstate's
attorney countered that an arbitration award would be bound within the policy limits of Wong's
insurance policy. (R.58). Wong's attorney, in his letter date May 14, 2002, stated that "[w]e had
agreed that the arbitrator will not be made aware of either the terms of the Arbitration Agreement
or the policy limits under the subject policy." (R.57). However, in his response letter dated May 15,
2002, Allstate's attorney did not acknowledge an agreement not to disclose policy limits to the
arbitrator. (R.58). The letter also expressed that Allstate would settle the claim for $70,000. (R. 58).
Arbitration started the next day, May 16, 2002. (R. 50).
d.

The Arbitration Award

On May 20, 2002, the arbitrator, Warren Driggs, decided in favor of Wong and awarded a
gross award of $321, 616.85. (R. 52). The award was reduced for liability coverage and P.I.P.
benefits previously paid, resulting in a net award amount of $260, 926.84. (R.52). The Arbitrator
based his "findings and conclusions" on the medical opinion of a doctor, the "credible testimony"
of Wong and his wife, the arbitrator's own observations, written evidence submitted by both parties,
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and the arguments of the lawyers. (R.50, 51). During the arbitration, Allstate did not introduce
evidence of policy limits in the insurance contract or otherwise contend that an award should be
limited to $100,000. (Id)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Parties to arbitration control the scope of matters submitted in arbitration. Parties express
their intentions regarding the scope of submission in their written agreement to arbitrate. When an
insurer and an insured submit an issue to arbitration, policy limits may play one of two roles in the
arbitration. First, if the parties either specifically agree to limit the scope of the arbitration to the
policy limits, or agree not to disclose those policy limits to the arbitrator, policy limits may limit the
scope of submission to an arbitrator.
Second, if the parties neither mention policy limits in their arbitration agreement nor agree
to withhold policy limits from the arbitrator, policy limits become an affirmative defense for the
insurer. In this second scenario, the parties submit the entire issue of contractual obligation,
including contractual limitations on liability, to the arbitrator. If the insurer fails to argue its
affirmative defense in arbitration, it may not reassert its defense in an attempt to modify the award
in court.
Wong and Allstate submitted an issue to arbitration: the extent and nature of Allstate's
contractual obligation to pay Wong's underinsured damages. In their Arbitration Agreement, there
was no mention of policy limits limiting an available award, and the parties were not forbidden from
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disclosing those policy limits to the arbitrator. Allstate did submit two items of set-off to the
arbitrator, the No-Fault PIP benefits paid, and the third-party recovery amount. There was no
apparent reason why it could not have submitted the policy limits to the arbitrator as an affirmative
defense to any award exceeding those limits. By failing to do so, Allstate exposed itself to the risk
that the arbitrator's assessment of its obligation might exceed those policy limits.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review
"[T]he standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator" due

to "long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes."
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941,946 (Utah 1996). A trial court's review of an
arbitration award is very limited and restricted to the "statutory grounds and procedures for review."
Intermountain Power v. Union Pacific RR.. 961 P.2d 320,322 (Utah 1998). In this case, the relevant
statutory ground under review was Utah Code Annotated § 78-31 a-15 (2002).* It allows a court to
modify an award if "the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to them." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (2002).

1

The Arbitration Act that the trial judge relied on was repealed, effective May 15, 2003,
and replaced with the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, effective May 15, 2003. Utah Code
Annotated 78-3la-125 largely replaced 78-3la-15.
6

An appellate court reviews a district court's modification of an arbitration award with "no
deference to the court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for correctness." Intermountain Power,
961P.2dat323.

II.

Petitioner And Respondent Submitted The Entire Issue Of Allstate5 s Obligation To Pay
Wong's Underinsured Damages
"Arbitration is a matter of contract/' and it "is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties

and provides a means of giving effect to the intention of the parties, easing court congestion, and
providing a method more expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." Cade v.
Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-1077 (Utah App. 1998). Like any other contract
question, the matter submitted to an arbitrator is defined by the parties' intent. And, like any other
contract, the parties' intent should be inferred from the Arbitration Agreement. Intermountain
Power, 961 P.2d at 325 ("[T]he arbitrator deduced the parties' contractual intent directly from the
language of the Agreement. This is as it should be."). In particular, the scope of submission is
defined by the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 325; CFI v.
Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002); Reed v. Davis County School Dist., 892 P.2d
1063,1065 (Utah App. 1995); E.KO.C v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,289 (2002).
Ambiguities in an arbitration agreement should "be liberally interpreted" to expand the scope
of arbitration. Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986); Lindon
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City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070,1073 (Utah 1981); King County v. Boeing Co.,
570 P.2d 713, 718 (Wash. App. 1977); Zimmerman v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 739 N.E. 2d 990,
995 (111. App. 2000). "If the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration." Docutel, 731 P.2d at 479; Mastrobuona v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
The question of what was submitted to the arbitrator is resolved by looking at the objective
evidence of the parties' intent. The objective evidence of the parties' intent is the Arbitration
Agreement itself; there is no evidence that the arbitration was required by the insurance policy, and
there is no incorporation by reference of any other terms, into the Agreement. In its original offer,
Allstate expressed an intent for the arbitrator to be bound by an undisclosed "high" of $100,000.
Wong, through his attorney, made a counteroffer that specifically excised any limits on the
arbitrator's award. At this point, Allstate had a choice: it could either insist, in a counteroffer, on
limiting the arbitrator's award according to the policy limits, or it could accept Wong's counteroffer
and proceed with arbitration. Allstate chose the latter.
Allstate was not forced to enter the Arbitration Agreement, as amended by Wong's attorney.
Allstate is a sophisticated party that knew or should have known that it was submitting the entire
issue of its obligation under the contract to an arbitrator. As such, it should have been prepared to
present the arbitrator with evidence of a contractual limitation on Allstate's obligation. Finally, no
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subsequent attempts at modifying the Agreement were successful,2 so the Agreement stood as it was
when the parties' drafted it.
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's decision. Under the Court of
Appeals' reading, the arbitrator's award was only an advisory opinion. The court held:
The Binding Arbitration Agreement states that the issue to be addressed by the arbitrator is
"underinsured motorist claim - damages." It does not state that any other matters are to be
addressed such as the specific amount Allstate must pay Wong under his underinsured
motorist policy.
2004 UT App 193, f 13. However, the Court of Appeals looked to the wrong document to determine
the scope of the arbitration. The "Binding Arbitration Agreement" was only a form document
prepared by the arbitrator, to memorialize his being hired as an arbitrator. Presumably, the main
purpose is to ensure that the arbitrator gets paid. It merely identifies which dispute the arbitrator is
to resolve. On the other hand, the scope of the arbitration was found in the Arbitration Agreement
prepared by the parties. The Court of Appeals could not really have believed that the parties intended
their carefully drafted, eleven (11) paragraph Arbitration Agreement to be completely superceded
by the arbitrator's handwritten "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages" notation on the
arbitrator's retention form. Such an interpretation of the parties' agreement flies in the face of the
use of arbitration as a final adjudication of a case.
If the arbitrator was free only to determine, in the abstract, Wong's total damages, then the
arbitration was only a preliminary fact-finding mission, to set the stage for further litigation under
2

See, infra, Part III.B.
9

the insurance policy. But the arbitration was not an evidentiary hearing or a preliminary skirmish;
they did not intend merely to satisfy their curiosity regarding the amount of damages that Wong
suffered. Instead, the parties intended the arbitration to resolve their whole dispute, not function as
a pre-cursor to further litigation.
III.

The Policy Limits Did Not Define The Scope Of Submission In The Arbitration
As the Court of Appeals admitted, Utah courts have not dealt with this issue before. Allstate

Insurance Co. v. Wong, 2004 UT App 193, f 11. A series of recent Colorado cases have considered
the effect of policy limits in arbitrations concerning insurance contracts. See Kutch v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 960 P. 2d 93 (Colo. 1998); Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Taylor, 45 P.3d 759, 761 (Colo. App. 2001); Applehans v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d
594 (Colo. App. 2003).
Colorado case law sets up two possible uses for insurance policy limits in arbitration. First,
if the parties intend, policy limits may limit the scope of submission to arbitration by an express
stipulation in the arbitration agreement. Second, the parties may agree to accept the policy limits as
defining the scope of submission by stipulating not to disclose the policy limits to the arbitrator, but
also expressly agreeing that the arbitrator's award be modified to conform to those limits.
If the parties submit an issue of contractual obligation to arbitration without mentioning
policy limits in the arbitration agreement, and there is no the policy limits do not define the scope
of submission - they become an insurer's affirmative defense. This second approach recognizes that
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when parties submit an issue of contractual obligation to an arbitrator, arbitration is the proper place
to discuss any contractual limitation on such liability.
This two-pronged approach satisfies the purposes and policies of arbitration in Utah. This
approach both respects the role of the parties' intent in determining the scope of matters submitted
to arbitration {see Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 325) and encourages the full and final resolution
of cases, thus promoting arbitration as a means to ueas[e] court congestion, and provid[e] a method
more expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." Lindon City, 636 P.2d at 1073.
A.

Analysis of Colorado Case Law

In Kutch, the Colorado Supreme Court speculated that an arbitrator could exceed his
authority by granting an award beyond insurance policy limits when an arbitrator ignores the policy
limits in an insurance contract. 960 P.2d at 98; Swan v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 8 P.3d
546 (Colo. App. 2000). However, in Taylor, the court distinguished Kutch and rejected a blanket
rule requiring trial judges to modify all arbitrated underinsured motorist insurance claim awards to
fit within policy limits. 45 P.3d at 763. The court explained that, in Kutch, "the arbitration provision
limited the arbitrable issue to whether the insured was entitled to collect damages from the uninsured
owner or driver, and the amount of those damages." Id.
In Taylor, however, "the underinsured motorist benefit payable to the insured was specifically
arbitrable and was submitted to arbitration." Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762-763. Therefore, the court held
that "the policy limits and setoff amounts were affirmative defenses to the insurer's obligation to pay
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benefits to the insured." Id. at 762. As such, they should have been presented during arbitration and
not brought up in an attempt to modify the arbitration award. Id. The court explained that "parties
to an arbitration are obligated... to present all relevant arguments, defense, and evidence during the
arbitration." Id. In Taylor, the "policy limit was an affirmative defense to the insurer's obligation
to pay benefits." Id.
The Taylor court affirmed the trial court's confirmation of the award and rejected the
insurer's policy limit argument because "the arbitration clause in this matter does not state that the
Arbitrator is to determine the amount of payment subject to the policy limitations." Taylor, 45 P.3d
at 762. The court quoted with approval the trial court's reasoning that "in light of... the fact that
the Arbitrator in this matter was not presented with the policy limitations prior to or during the
arbitration hearing . . . and the absence of any language qualifying the Arbitrator's power to
determine the amount of payment within the arbitration clause, the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to
determine the amount of payment that should be made, without qualification." Taylor, 45 P.3d at
760-761.
InApplehans, the court clarified the distinction made by Taylor. Appleham, 68 P.3d at 599.
The court held that if "there was no stipulation . . . regarding policy limits . . . [then] the trial court
should confirm the initial award in favor of plaintiff in excess of policy limits. Id. at 601.
"However, if the court finds that the parties had stipulated to be bound by policy limits, to apply a
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setoff, and not to submit those issues to the arbitrator, the court must vacate the arbitrator's initial
award to the extent that it exceeds the policy limits and ignores the setoff." Id.
B.

By Failing To Introduce Evidence Of Policy Limits In Arbitration, Allstate
Waived Its Affirmative Defense

The arbitration agreement between Wong and Allstate contained no stipulation to bind the
arbitrator's award within policy limits. (R.47). The Arbitration Agreement's stipulation of nondisclosure of a high/low agreement is meaningless because the parties crossed out the high/low
agreement prior to signing and executing the contract - there was no 'agreement' within that clause
to disclose. (R.47). In short, the Agreement contained no reference to policy limits limiting the
scope of submission, and the Agreement did not forbid any party from disclosing those limits to the
arbitrator.
Because the arbitration agreement contains no stipulation regarding the amount of award or
the use of policy limits, Allstate had an obligation to present evidence, including the existence of a
policy limit, during the arbitration to limit any potential award. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762. Other setoffs
were reflected in the arbitration award (R. 52); Allstate had an opportunity and obligation to present
the policy limits in arbitration and not wait to present the affirmative defense of the existence of
policy limits until the award is contested in court. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762; Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599.
In correspondence subsequent to the formation of the Arbitration Agreement, the parties
never agreed to limit the arbitration award to the policy limits or to withhold the policy limits from
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the arbitrator. Wong's attorney suggested an agreement not to disclose the "policy limits under the
subject policy" to the arbitrator, but Allstate did not assent to such a stipulation. (R.57, 58).3 In
order for Allstate to have been bound by a nondisclosure agreement, Allstate would have had to
agree in writing.

Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035, 1037 (Utah 2001)

(Modifications to arbitration agreements must satisfy the writing requirements of the statute of
frauds.). Allstate did not agree to modify the arbitration agreement to require nondisclosure; neither
party was bound to keep silent. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762; Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599. Therefore,
Allstate was bound to bring its dispute over the effect of the policy limits to the arbitrator's attention
during arbitration or waive this affirmative defense. Applehans, 68 P.3d at 599. Otherwise, excuse
of Allstate's "procedural defaults . . . would undermine the use of arbitration as a method of
resolving disputes efficiently, conclusively, and comprehensively." Taylor, 45 P.3d at 763.
CONCLUSION
The arbitration award in this case should be enforced against Allstate. In the absence of
limiting language in the Arbitration Agreement itself, the arbitrator's award completely resolved all
the parties' rights under the insurance contract. The arbitrator's net award, including the damages
that may have exceeded the policy limits, was within the scope of submission, as determined by the
parties' Arbitration Agreement. Allstate and Wong submitted the issue of contractual liability under
the insurance policy without limiting the scope of submission to within the policy limits. Allstate
3

By the same token, Allstate suggested that they agree to be bound by the policy limits in
the contract (R.58), and Wong disagreed. (R.57).
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failed in the arbitration to present its affirmative defense of policy limits to its contractual liability.
Allstate thus waived this defense and has no remedy against enforcement of the arbitration award.
This Court should adopt the two-pronged approach (explained, supra, in Part III) to using
policy limits in determining the scope of matters submitted in arbitration. This approach is supported
by Utah public policy regarding arbitration. Utah public policy endorses three aspects of arbitration
that are promoted by this approach: (1) the intent of the parties rules the process of arbitration and
determines the scope of matters submitted; (2) arbitrators have the power to fully and finally
determine all issues submitted to arbitration; and (3) once an issue is submitted, argued, and decided
in arbitration, a party may not relitigate that issue, and courts have very limited grounds on which
to review an arbitration.
In the arbitration, because Allstate failed to present evidence of any contractual limitation,
such as policy limits, on its liability to Wong, the arbitrator could not rely on any policy limits to
limit his award. The trial court erred in modifying the award because it relied on an insurance
contract that was extraneous to the Arbitration Agreement. By modifying the award, the trial court
impermissibly reviewed the merits of the arbitration and the arbitrator's decision, by directly
applying the parties' insurance contract. The determination of obligations and rights under the
insurance contract was completely submitted to the arbitrator, and the trial court had no legitimate
ground on which to second-guess the arbitrator's conclusion.

15

The Court of Appeals was in error, and this Court should reverse its decision and order
enforcement of the arbitration award in this case without modification.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this _ > _ day of January, 2005.

Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin R. Robson
BERTCH ROBSON
Attorneys for Petitioner Dixon Wong
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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO MODIFY ARBITRATOR'S AWARD
(J. Bohling, December 16,2002)

t hird Judicial District

DEC 1 6 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By

Deputy Clerk

LYNN S. DAVIES [A0824]
CHRISTIAN S. COLLINS [A8452]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Petitioner
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone-(801) 531-2000
Fax N o : (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO MODIFY
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD

vs.
DIXON WONG,
Respondent.

Civil No. 020905129
Judge William B. Bohling

Petitioner Allstate Insurance Company's Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or
n the Alternative, Motion for Modification of Arbitrator's Award, came on regularly and
pursuant to notice before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling
residing, on October 31, 2002. Petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, was represented by its
counsel, Lynn S. Davies of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson Respondent, Dixon Wong, was
present and represented by his counsel, Preston L Handy of Siegfried & Jensen. The court had
eviewed and considered all of the

memoranda, exhibits, and filings pertinent to that motion, as well as related motions. The court
heard argument from counsel for petitioner and from counsel for respondent.
This case arises out of an underinsured motorist insurance policy, wherein Allstate
Insurance Company was the insurer, and Dixon Wong was the insured. It is undisputed that the
applicable insurance policy limits were in the amount of $100,000 for underinsured motorist
coverage. Respondent, Mr. Wong, was involved in an automobile accident and recovered policy
limits from the insurer for the tortfeasor in that accident, in the amount of $50,000. Respondent,
Mr. Wong, then made a claim against petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, his own insurance
carrier, for his underinsured policy limits. Those parties were unable to reach an agreement as to
the settlement value of the claim, and therefore agreed to invoke the provision of the underinsured
motorist policy providing for arbitration of the claim. The parties, through their attorneys,
entered into an agreement entitled "Arbitration Agreement," signed respectively by counsel for
respondent, Mr. Wong, on February 5, 2002, and by counsel for petitioner, Allstate Insurance
Company, on March 21, 2002.
The parties, also through their attorneys, entered into a "Binding Arbitration
Agreement" submitted to them by the arbitrator, Warren W. Driggs; on March 18, 2002,
indicating that the "Nature of Dispute" was "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." The
matter was arbitrated on May 16, 2002 The arbitrator entered an award dated May 20, 2002, in
the net amount of $260,926 84
The court finds that the underinsured motorist policy constitutes a contract, and
that the policy limits of $100,000 define the outer extent of exposure to petitioner, Allstate
Insurance Company, on a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration award in
2

excess of the $100,000 policy limits was beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties. The
Arbitration Agreement did not operate to open or modify the terms of the insurance contract. In
accordance with the applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(l)(c)(1996), and applicable
Utah case law, including Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah
1996), and Soft Solutions, Inc v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, ^14, 1 P.3d 1095, the
court finds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess of
$100,000, that the award is beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and that the
award lacks adequate foundation in reason or fact. The court finds that the insurance policy limits
of $100,000 constitute a contractual determination of the parties, which are not modified or
altered by virtue of the arbitration agreements.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the arbitrator's award is hereby
modified to conform to the policy limits of $100,000, this Order to constitute a judgment in said
amount as requested in the alternative by petitioner. Therefore, this matter is resolved in favor of
Detitioner and against respondent.
MADE AND ENTERED this l[p

day of

£)£g. .

2002.

BY THE COURT:

M lAl&b
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING
PRESIDING
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

Preston L. Handy
Attorneys for Respondent
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
%1
Dixon Wong appeals the trial court's order granting Allstate
Insurance Company's (Allstate) Motion to Modify Arbitrator's
Award. Wong argues that the trial court erred by (1) modifying
the arbitrator's award to conform to the underinsured policy
limits and (2) considering extrinsic evidence to conclude that
the arbitrator had exceeded nis authority.
BACKGROUND
%2
On June 1, 2002, Wong sustained serious injuries in an
automobile accident in which the other driver was at fault. Wong
recovered $50,000 from the other driver's liability policy and
$10,690 from his own personal injury protection (PIP) insurance.
Wong subsequently filed a claim under his underinsured motorist
policy with Allstate. Wong's policy has a recovery limit of
$100,000 per person. Allstate disputed the amount of damages
claimed by Wong. Thus, the parties agreed to submit their

dispute to arbitration1 and signed two documents: (1) an
Arbitration Agreement and (2) a Binding Arbitration Agreement.
1J3
The Arbitration Agreement, drafted by counsel for Allstate,2
originally contained a high/low clause which stated that "[t]he
parties agree to be bound by a high/low agreement with a high of
$100,000 and a low of $0.00. The terms of this high/low
agreement shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator." However,
counsel for Wong crossed out the first line of the proposed
agreement and reference to the high/low agreement in the second
line so that the clause read: "The terms of this agreement shall
not be disclosed to the arbitrator." Counsel for Wong signed and
returned the Arbitration Agreement to counsel for Allstate who
also signed it with all references to the high/low agreement
crossed out. The remaining provisions in the Arbitration
Agreement addressed only the rules and procedures for conducting
the arbitration.
H4
On March 18, 2002, the parties signed the Binding
Arbitration Agreement, which defined the nature of the dispute to
be arbitrated as "underinsured motorist claim--damages." On May
14, 2002, counsel for Wong sent a letter to Allstate's counsel
confirming their agreement that the dispute would be arbitrated
without a high/low agreement in place and without making the
arbitrator aware of the Arbitration Agreement or the policy
limits. On May 15, 2002, counsel for Allstate replied by letter
affirming their agreement not to submit a high/low provision to
the arbitrator but also indicating Allstate's position that Wong
is bound by the $100,000 policy limit regardless of the amount
the arbitrator awards.
1|5
The arbitration hearing was held the following day, May 16,
2 002. Neither party introduced Wong's insurance policy or any
evidence regarding policy limits, and the arbitrator did not
request that information. The arbitrator found that Wong had
suffered $321,616.85 in damages and awarded a net amount of
$260,926,84 after subtracting the liability coverage and PIP
benefits previously paid to Wong.
H6
When Wong refused to accept Allstate's tender of $100,000,
Allstate timely filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or
in the Alternative, Motion for Modification of Arbitrator's
1. There is no evidence that Wong's insurance policy with
Allstate contained an arbitration clause. Rather, it appears
that both parties agreed to arbitration after the dispute arose.
2. At the arbitration, counsel for Allstate was Leonard E. McGee
and counsel for Wong was Preston L. Handy.

Award. Allstate provided the trial court an affidavit from an
Allstate insurance adjuster and the declarations page of Wong's
policy as evidence of the $100,000 policy limit. After a hearing
on Allstate's motion, the trial court found that "the arbitrator
exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess
of $100,000, that the award is beyond the reasonable
contemplation of the parties, and that award lacks adequate
foundation in reason or fact." The court ordered that the
arbitrator's award be modified to conform to the policy limits of
$10 0,000. Wong appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
^[7
Wong asserts that the trial court erred by granting
Allstate's motion to modify the arbitration award because the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding an amount
greater than Wong's underinsured motorist policy limit. There
are two standards applicable to the review of arbitration awards:
the standard applied by the trial court in reviewing the
arbitration award and the standard applied in an appellate review
of the trial court's decision. See Softsolutions, Inc. v.
Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46,^10, 1 P.3d 1095. "The standard
of review for a trial court 'is an extremely narrow one' giving
1
"considerable leeway to the arbitrator,"' and setting aside the
arbitrator's decision '"only in certain narrow circumstances."'"
Id. (quoting Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.,
925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996) (other citation omitted)).
Further, "[t]he trial court 'may not substitute its judgment for
that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an award
because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment.'" Id.
(quoting Buzas Baseball, Inc., 925 P.2d at 947) .
%8
"In reviewing the order of the district court confirming,
vacating, or modifying an arbitration award, we grant no
def srsPc Q *~o the court' s conclusions of "^ aw r°view^ no ^"H^TTI for
correctness." Id. at Hl2. In particular, our "scope of review
is limited to the legal issue of whether the trial court
correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain Power Agency v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998).
ANALYSIS
1(9
Wong asserts that the trial court erred by modifying the
arbitrator's award and by considering extrinsic evidence in
interpreting the scope of the parties' submission. Under the
Utah Arbitration Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-l to

-20 (2002),3 a trial court must vacate an arbitration "award if
it appears . . . the arbitrators exceeded their powers." Id. §
78-31a-14(l) (c) .4 The Act also requires a trial court to "modify
or correct the award if it appears [that] . . . the arbitrators'
award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the award
can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon
the issues submitted." Id. § 78-31a-15 (1) (b) (emphasis added). 5
3. The Act was repealed and a new Chapter 31a was enacted in its
place effective May 15, 2003. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-101
to -131 (2002) .
4.

The full text of that former provision provides:
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to
the arbitration proceeding for vacation of
the award, the court shall vacate the award
if it appears:

(a) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a
neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator
was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the
rights of any party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their
powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown,
refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the
hearing to the substantial prejudice of the
rights of a party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement
between the parties to the arbitration
proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1) (2002).

5.

The full text of that former provision provides:
(1) Upon motion made within 2 0 days after a
copy of the award is served upon the moving
party, the court shall modify or correct the
award if it appears:
(a) there was an evident miscalculation
of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person or property
referred to in the award;
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a
matter not submitted to them, if the award
can be corrected without affecting the merits
(continued...)

Here, the trial court found that under section 78-31a-14(l)(c),
the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Rather than vacating the
award as required by the Act, the trial court modified it to
conform to Wong's underinsured motorist policy limits. We
conclude this was error.
HlO Allowing the trial court to vacate that portion of the
arbitration award which exceeds the limits of Wong's insurance
policy actually modifies the award without determining whether
modification is warranted under the Act. Where a trial court
determines that an arbitrator exceeds his authority, the proper
remedy is to vacate the entire award and "order a rehearing
before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbitration
agreement or by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(3).
Kll While this is an issue of first impression in Utah,
addressing the statutory provisions separately is consistent with
Utah case law. In Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University,
2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's order denying the appellant's motion to vacate or,
in the alternative, modify an arbitration award. See id. at f57.
The court held that under the Act, a trial court must vacate an
arbitration award if it appears that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority. See id. at ^15. The court explained that for a trial
court to conclude an arbitrator exceeded his authority it must
"(1) review the submission agreement and determine that the
'arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the
submission agreement,' or (2) determine that an award is 'without
foundation in reason or fact.'" Id. (quoting Buzas Baseball,
Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 950 (Utah 1996)
(other quotations and citations omitted)). In a separate
paragraph, the court stated that the Act requires a trial court
"to modify an arbitration award if it appears that 'the
arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the
award upon the issues submitted.'" Id. at ^[16 (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996)). The court then addressed each
claim separately under the two statutory provisions. See id. at

11117-39.
1|l2 Because the trial court in the instant case modified, rather
than vacated, the arbitration award, we must examine whether the
modification was appropriate under section 78-31a-15 (1) . In
particular, we must determine whether the trial court could have
5.

(...continued)
of the award upon the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l) (2002).

o r\ r\

found that the arbitrator's "award [was] based on a matter not
submitted to [him]" and, if so, whether the award "can be
corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the
issues submitted." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b).
Kl3 First, the trial court could have found that the arbitrator
based his award on a matter not presented in the parties'
submission agreement. The Binding Arbitration Agreement states
that the issue to be addressed by the arbitrator is "underinsured
motorist claim--damages." It does not state that any other
matters are to be addressed such as the specific amount Allstate
must pay Wong under his underinsured motorist insurance policy.
The arbitrator correctly determined that Wong had suffered a
total of $321,616.85 in damages. However, the arbitrator also
decided the net amount to be paid to Wong by Allstate, a "matter
not submitted to [him]." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b). In
particular, the arbitrator reduced the total amount of damages by
$60,690.00 for liability coverage and PIP benefits previously
paid and awarded Wong a net amount of $260,926.84. However, the
matter submitted to the arbitrator was the total amount of
damages incurred by Wong without regard to policy limits or other
set-off amounts. Therefore, had the trial court examined the
Binding Arbitration Agreement and the arbitration award, it could
have reasonably concluded that the arbitrator's award was based
on a matter not submitted to him.
Kl4 Second, the trial court could have corrected the award
without affecting the merits of the award upon the issue
submitted to arbitration by the parties. See id. Specifically,
because the arbitrator determined what damages Wong suffered
prior to calculating the net amount awarded, the trial court
could have modified the award to reflect the only issue properly
before the arbitrator: damages suffered by Wong without regard
to policy limits or other set-off amounts. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court could have corrected the award without
affecting the merits upon the matter submitted to arbitration.
Accordingly, the trial court should have modified the
arbitrator's award to reflect the matter submitted to arbitration
and entered the total amount of damages incurred by Wong as
$321,616.85.
^jl5 However, the total amount of damages incurred by Wong has no
bearing on the maximum amount Allstate could pay Wong pursuant to
his underinsured motorist policy. The trial court held that
the underinsured motorist policy constitutes
a contract, and . . . the policy limits of
$100,000 define the outer extent of exposure
to [Allstate] on a claim for underinsured
motorist benefits. . . . The Arbitration

Agreement did not operate to open or modify
the terms of the insurance contract. . . .
The court finds that the insurance policy
limits of $100,000 constitute a contractual
determination of the parties, which are not
modified or altered by virtue of the
arbitration agreements.
We agree. There is no evidence that the parties intended the
prior contractual relationship to be modified by either the
Arbitration Agreement or the Binding Arbitration Agreement. In
fact, correspondence between the parties just prior to the
arbitration evidences the opposite intent. Therefore, while the
trial court should have modified the arbitration agreement to
reflect the matter submitted to the arbitrator, the trial court
correctly found that the arbitration did not modify the original
contractual obligations of the parties and ordered that Allstate
pay Wong $100,000 pursuant to his insurance policy.6
Accordingly, we affirm.7

m.
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

fl6

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H. Jackson ^ % d g 6

6. However, a better way to reach the same correct result would
have been for Allstate to file a declaratory action asking the
court to determine the effect of the arbitrator's award on
Allstatefs obligation to pay Wong, its insured under the policy.
7. Wong also seeks attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
section 78-31a-16 (2003) . Because we affirm, attorney fees are
not warranted.

